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An Agency Perspective of
Auditor Change in Small Firms
Kevin Keasey
Robert Watson

This paper uses an agency theory perspective to develop an understanding of
the determinants of auditor change for small firms in the United Kingdom. The
paper, therefore, extends the existing literature (see Williams [22] and Francis
and Wilson [9]) from a consideration of auditor change for large firms in the
United States to small firms in the U.K. The results indicate that small U.K. firm s
have a greater propensity to change their auditors subsequent to the receipt of
a first-time audit qualification, to a change in the composition of their board
of directors, to a change in their use of external loan capital, and when their
existing loans are not secured. The results indicate some support for the agency
arguments examined, though there is also evidence of auditor ‘accommodation’
being sought.

INTRODUCTION
The recent growth in the phenomenon of auditor change has raised fears
concerning the independence of auditors. It is sometimes suspected that the
decision to change auditors is the consequence of firms shopping around’
for more accommodating monitors, that is, auditors who are more willing
to agree to clients’ wishes. Fears such as these seem to lie behind recent
attempts, such as the U.K. government’s proposed implementation of the
EC’s Eighth Company Law Directive (DTI [7]), to make it more difficult
and costly for firms to dismiss their auditors and to limit the extent of
economic dependence of auditors on individual clients.
Nevertheless, the desire of firms to seek accommodating auditors is
unlikely to provide the only, or even the most important, reason for changing
auditors. Other reasons for change may include a need for a more specialized,
better quality or cheaper audit service, or be due to a change in the contracting
environment (i.e., the arrival of a new management team/chief executive,
a rapid change in either the size or nature of the client’s operations).
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T he available em pirical evidence seems to bear this out. A num ber of
em pirical studies (i.e., C how and Rice [4], De A ngelo [6 ], Schwartz and
M enon [19], Crasswell [5], W illiam s [22], Francis and W ilson [9]) have found
an association between changes in auditors and such factors as
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)

changes in corporate m anagem ent,
the receipt of a qualified audit report,
the extent of non-audit services provided,
the industry specialization of the audit firm,
the financial condition of the client com pany,
changes in share bonus schemes, and
changes in the diffusion of share ow nership.

However, the existing research on auditor change has been exclusively
concerned w ith the large, p u b lic ly -q u o te d , co m p a n y sector. T h is
concentration on large firms is som ewhat surprising given that there are
arguments that suggest auditor changes m igh t be more frequent w ith in the
sm all firm sector. For instance, many of the costs associated w ith changing
auditors, particularly search and setup costs, are likely to be relatively lower
for sm all firms than for large firms. Nevertheless, it may be that for very small
firms the opportunity costs o f the ow ner’s tim e in searching for a new auditor
may be very expensive. Auditor independence may also be more of a problem
w ithin this sector because of the lack o f regular p u b lic scrutiny by capital
market interests. As Moizer [16] has noted, both listed com panies and their
auditors have a strong econom ic interest in m ain taining independence;
Auditors who are perceived to be more independent and hence more likely to report
a breach by management, will be valued more highly by the capital market. The greater
the reputation enjoyed by auditors, then the greater will be the increase in market value
of the companies audited by them and hence the greater will be the fees that they can
command for audit services (p. 36).

However, many im portant features of the sm all firm sector, such as a
lack of separation of ow nership from control, the m uch less stringent
financial reporting and other regulatory requirements and the very wide
variety of audit firms that are able to audit their accounts, reduce the
applicability of this line of reasoning. T hus, m uch of the large firm research
findings w ill be of lim ited relevance to this sector. T h is paper, however,
utilizes the large firm agency-based models of W illiam s [22] and Francis and
W ilson [9] to guide the em pirical analysis of auditor change in the U.K. small
firm sector.
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T h e paper is organized into four sections. T he first section develops a
general m odel of auditor change for sm all firms. T he second section describes
the data set, the m odel, the variables and the em pirical methods. T he third
section presents the em pirical findings and the final section discusses the
results in the ligh t of the existing literature.
AGENCY PERSPECTIVES A N D
A U D IT O R C H A N G E IN SM ALL FIRMS
T h is section briefly describes W illiam s’ and Francis and W ilson’s models
of auditor change. T h e m odels are then developed to take into account
differences in the OM^nership structure, regulatory and other environm ental
features so as to make them applicable to sm all firms in the U.K. W illiam s’
m odel of auditor change is derived from an agency setting characterized by
uncertainty, inform ation asymmetries and conflicting interests between
managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) and other contracting
entities. In this setting, the possibility of both ex ante (adverse selection) and
ex post (moral hazard) opportunism exists (see Jensen and M eckling [11]).
From this perspective, the demand for auditing is motivated by the need for
reliable and accurate financial inform ation to reduce the manager’s superior
inform ation position. T h is has provided a rationale for the “traditional”
stewardship function of auditing. By providing the means whereby the
performance of managers can be monitored, the moral hazard problem can
be largely ameliorated by the appointm ent of independent external auditors.
A sim ilar agency perspective is adopted in the Francis and W ilson paper.
In the large firm studies, the major focus has been upon the conflict
between managers and shareholders (owners). However, this particular type
of conflict w ill not norm ally be im portant for the majority of sm all firms
because of their close com pany status. Broadly speaking, a close com pany
is a com pany under the control of five or fewer people and their associates,
w hich includes close fam ily members (see Burns and Dewhirst [3]). T he
agency problem s that arise between stockholders and m anagem ent are,
therefore, of reduced im portance for close com panies since the director/
managers are usually the major stockholders. However, there is the
possibility of conflict arising between the owner/m anagers and other
contracting entities such as external lending institutions (banks and venture
capitalists) and other creditors. Agency theory suggests that debtholders are
concerned w ith the possibility of w ealth transfers to stockholders. R eview ing
the arguments of Eichenseher and Shields [8 ], Palmrose [18], and Sim unic
and Stein [20], Francis and W ilson note that if managers are more concerned
w ith the interests of stockholders than debtholders, then increases in debt
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contracts should lead to a dem and by debtholders for tighter audits.
Essentially, this argum ent views the equity of a levered firm as a call option
(see Black and Scholes [2]) in that increasing levels of debt lead o w n er/
managers (of close com panies) to take on increasingly risky projects since
they benefit from the upside risk but bear no more dow nside risk as debt
levels increase.
Francis and W ilson, however, contrast w ith this hypothesis concerning
new debtholders, the hypotheses developed by H ealy and Lys [10] and
Johnson and Lys [12] for existing debt. T hese authors argue that, since
managers prefer to take actions that benefit stockholders rather than
debtholders (especially the case for close com panies where owners and
managers are synonym ous) they w ill be motivated to change to more
accom m odating auditors because this w ill allow value to be switched from
debtholders to stockholders. T h is argum ent is based on the fact that, w hile
existing debt agreements can be monitored, existing debtholders are usually
not in a position to alter the conditions pertaining to these contracts. T hus,
unless explicitly prohibited from doing so, ow ner/m anagers w ill norm ally
be able to change their auditor w ithout requiring the agreement o f existing
debtholders. T h is argum ent needs to be conditioned, however, by the
possibility that the debt may need to be ‘rolled-over’ in the future. T h e debt
bonding perspective adopted in this paper recognizes that where there is a
high level of existing debt, the ow ner/m anagers may have both strong
incentives and the ability to change to more ‘accom m odating’ auditors but
also, w hen new debt is required, the debtholders are likely to dem and less
‘accom m odating’ auditors. T hus owner/m anagers w ill attem pt to engage
au d ito rs th at sa tisfy ex tern al le n d e r s’ req u irem en ts w h ile b e in g
accom m odating to their ow n needs.
From this agency perspective of auditing, W illiam s developed the
follow ing three concepts that help explain how certain events m igh t lead
to auditor change:
(1 )
(2)
(3)

Changes in the client’s contracting environm ent
Auditor competence
Client reputation

We take some of these broad concepts and develop new proxy variables that
are relevant to auditor change for sm all firms in the U.K.
(1 )

Change in C lient’s Contracting Environm ent

T he agency perspective of auditing, portrays the dem and for auditing
as arising from the set of contracts that exist w ith in a firm. If the set of
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contracts changes then this could give rise to a change in the demand for
auditing services. Three operational variables are derived to allow for changes
in principal-agent contracts.
X i = num ber of changes in directors in the two years im m ediately prior
to an auditor switch. T h is is included because the arrival or departure of
directors is a major factor in determ ining principal-agent contracts w ithin
close com panies.

X 2 = absolute change in firm size. W illiam s argues that rapid change
in firm size can be a measure of new principal-agent contracts. Growth or
decline w ill create new contractual agreements. For instance, owners may
become sepzirate from managers as growth occurs. In addition, customers
and suppliers may join /leave the firm as it changes the scale of its operations.
Of course, client size or growth could also be associated w ith the em ploym ent
of larger audit firms due to technology or audit efficiency arguments. N o
attempt is made in this paper to determine the specific reasons why auditor
change may be associated w ith client size and/or growth.
X 3 = absolute change in loans/total assets. T h is is designed to capture
changes in the involvem ent of external loan capital suppliers in the firm.
For instance, a firm that greatly increases its reliance on external loan capital
may be required to engage a new auditor acceptable to the suppliers of the
new loan(s). Alternatively, a firm that has substantially reduced its reliance
on loan capital may now w ish to em ploy a different, and possibly cheaper,
auditor.
(2)

Auditor C om petence/Supply

T h e second concept discussed by W illiam s relates to the com petence/
effectiveness of the auditor. H e argues that principals (for close com panies,
this w ill also include debtholders) w ould want to change an ineffective
auditor. However, as is argued below , it is difficult to em pirically determine
directly w hen an auditor is seen as being ineffective. Accordingly two
variables are developed that may capture notions of auditor com petence/
effectiveness. At the same time it needs to be recognized, however, that these
variables may be proxying for supply conditions rather than effectiveness.
X 4 = does the auditor belong to the top 2 0 firms of auditors in terms
of fee incom e (see Accountancy [1 ]) or otherwise. Auditors belonging to the
top 2 0 auditors may be considered as having reasonably uniform and h igh
levels of expertise. In contrast, the set of non-top 20 auditors are likely to

'. W iiW U y
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have a wider range and generally lower levels of expertise as com pared to
the top 20 audit firms. We, therefore, hypothesize, at the m ost general level,
that changes in the demand for auditor effectiveness are more likely to result
in a change of auditor if the firm em ploys a non-top 20 audit practice than
if it em ploys a top 20 audit firm.

Xs = firm size in year prior to auditor change. We hypothesize that the
smaller firm w ill find it easier to change auditors, for whatever reason
(including disagreements over effectiveness), than larger firms. T h is is
because the smaller firm w ill have a larger potential supply of effective
auditors than the larger firm. Even the sm allest (i.e., one person) audit firm
is able, and legally permitted, to undertake the auditing tasks of the smallest
firms. In contrast, w hen firms dem and a more substantial or specialized
auditing services, then the effective supply dim inishes. For this reason, it is
rare indeed for the largest (few hundred or so) listed com panies to be audited
by any audit firm not belonging to the ‘Big-8.’
(3)

C lient R eputation

T he third concept discussed by W illiam s is that a firm may seek a change
of auditor if management perceive that their reputation has been tarnished.
However, only firms with a substantial degree of external involvem ent with
loan creditors and outside (non-director) shareholders, are likely to have a
strong motive to protect their reputations. Thus, under this heading we
distinguish three sets of variables relating to audit qualifications (Xe), financial
condition (X?) and the extent of external interest in the firm (Xg to Xio).

Xe = receipt of a first tim e ‘Sm all C om pany’ audit qualification in the
year prior to change. A firm may seek to avoid the ‘bad new s’ and costs
(Crasswell [5]) associated w ith further qualification by changin g auditors.
However, in contrast to the large firm literature on audit qualifications, the
receipt of the sm all firm audit qualification is generally viewed as lacking
in inform ation content because many auditors have a general tendency to
issue them (see Page [17] and Keasey, W atson and Wynarczyk [14]).
Nevertheless, we include the receipt of a first tim e audit qualification as an
explanatory variable, because previous work by Keasey and W atson [13] into
financial distress prediction has show n that first tim e qualifications do
convey useful inform ation. Other types of qualification are not examined
(despite the results of Crasswell [5]) because of their comparative rarity.
X j = change in earnings/total assets. T h is variable is included to capture
the financial health of the company. As argued by W illiam s, and Schwartz
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and M enon [19], firms w ith declining financial health are more likely to
change auditors in an attem pt to keep the ‘bad new s’ from external parties.
W hile there is little agreement over w hich variables capture the health of
the sm all firm (see Storey et al. [21] for a discussion of this point), it w ould
seem reasonable to expect increasing (decreasing) returns on assets to be
indicative of general financial health (im pending distress).
Xg = loan s/total assets.

Xg = secured loan (1 = yes; 0 = no).
Xio = num ber of non-director shareholders.
T hese variables are intended to capture the degree of external
involvem ent/interest in the com pany. As argued above, com panies w ith
proportionately higher loans have a greater incentive to change to more
accom m odating auditors. In contrast, firms w ith loans secured on their
business assets may be constrained in their choice of auditors and thus are
less likely to change auditors. T h is is because, in order to be assured that
their investm ent is being adequately protected, m ost mortgage agreements
contain provisions w hich require the agreement of the mortgage holder
before any change in auditors can take place. In other words, principals
cautious enough to secure their loans on tangible assets ensure that the
m onitoring of the enterprise cannot be adjusted to the benefit of the loan
recipient. Sim ilarly, firms that have a greater number of shareholders that
are not involved in the day-to-day m anagem ent of the business are also less
likely to change auditors because of the need to retain the confidence of these
investors.
D A TA , VARIABLES A N D EMPIRICAL M ETH O D S
Data
As the data used in this paper has already been described in an earlier
article (see Keasey, W atson and Wynarczyk [14]) it it is only briefly described
here. In the U.K. there is a statutory requirem ent for all lim ited liability
firms, irrespective of size, to lodge their annual audited accounts w ith the
Registrar of C om panies at C om panies H ouse. T he authors are not aware
of a com parable dataset for the U.S. T h e data used in this study comes from
C om panies H ouse records and consists of 180 single-plant, independentlyowned m anufacturing com panies operating in the Northeast of E ngland
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for 1979-1982. W hile som e concerns may be expressed over the age and
regional nature of this data, the authors believe such concerns are largely
unfounded. R egarding the regional nature of the data, it is difficult to see
why the situation w ith respect to au d itin g w ou ld be any different for the
Northeast of England as compared to other areas. In terms of the age of
the data, it is difficult to see w hy the environm ents faced by sm all firms
should have changed so dramatically so as to alter the conclusions of the
present analysis.
Given the nature of the variables, some of w hich are com puted over a
two year period, this data set provides sufficient observations for the
construction of two annual models, each w ith 180 observations, and one
‘pooled’ model consisting of 360 observations. For these 360 observations.
Table 1 gives the frequencies of the types of auditor change that occurred.
In terms of the arguments presented in the previous section, the empirical
analysis is restricted to auditor changes where the instigators of change were
the firms rather than the auditors. In other words, if an auditor put h im /
herself forward for reappointm ent in the notes to a set of accounts, then any
change of auditor in the year follow ing the accounts is assum ed to be a result
of firm actions rather than auditor instigation. O f the 360 observations, 84
(or 23.3%) had an auditor change for ‘firm ’ reasons and 0 at the behest of the
auditors. W hile this figure for auditor change seems h igh as compared to the
figures from existing studies (these generally range from 3-15%; see Crasswell
[5] for a review), the present sample is concerned w ith sm all firms as compared
to the large firms of previous studies. T he large p ool of potential auditors
for the small firm market w ould suggest, in the first instance, that sm all firms
are more likely to change auditors because for the majority there are
potentially lower search costs. T h is argument receives some supf)ort from the
fact that 69 of the 84 auditor changes were from one sm all audit firm to another
sm all a u d it firm . In a d d itio n to the a v a ila b ility o f su p p ly
Table 1
Auditor Changes
No change

276

Change from Small Audit Firm to Small Audit Firm

69

Change from Small Audit Firm to Large Audit Firm

0

Change from Large Audit Firm to Small Audit Firm

0

Change from Large Audit Firm to Large Audit Firm

15

TOTAL Changes
TOTAL Cases

g4
jgQ
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argum ent, it w ould seem reasonable to expect more auditor sw itching for
sm all firms, as compared to large, because of the potentially large changes
in their grow th, profitability, size, etc. (see Storey et al [21]). W hile there is
no direct support from T able 1 for this hypothesis, in that there is no evidence
of sw itching between sm all and large aucHt firms, it is possible that changing
auditors w ith in the two (broadly defined) categories is sufficient to meet the
needs created by such changes.
In an ideal em pirical setting the auditor switch dependent variable
w ould be defined/m easured so as to reflect the change in auditor ‘q u ality’
achieved by any switch. G iven the nature of the data available for sm all
firms, the quality categorization was restricted to top 20 and non-top 20.
As it turned ou t there were no switches between these tw o categories for
the present sam ple. T h is does not, however, im ply that switches have been
between equal ‘q u ality’ auditors. For both the non-top 20 and top 20 sets
of auditors are likely to have ranges of audit ‘qu ality.’ However, given the
local nature of the audit market for sm all firms and the fact that auditor
reputations w ill be locally based, it is difficult to see how a robust measure
of auditor quality cou ld be defined for sm all firm studies. Accordingly, the
em pirical analysis of this paper is restricted to a consideration of
explanations of auditor change w ith out reference to ‘changes in qu ality’.
Finally, as a check on the consistency of this approach, the em pirical
analysis was conducted for the overall sam ple of 84 auditor changes and
for the 69 auditor changes between sm all audit firms. As the em pirical results
were essentially the same for both samples, discussion is restricted to the
overall sam ple results.
Variables
G iven the data available from Com panies H ouse, and the arguments
presented in the previous section, the general model used to determine w hich
factors influence the changing of auditors is as follows:

y = /(Xi, X2,...Xio)
W here Y is the dependent variable, coded 1 if a firm sw itched auditors
and 0 otherw ise. T h e d efin itio n o f the independent variables are detailed
in T ab le 2. T h e sam ple was random ly selected from a w ide range of
industries and as the industry dum m y variables were not statistically
sign ifican t w h en inclu ded, in the equations, they are n ot inclu ded in the
present analysis.
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Table 2
Independent Variable
Xi

is defined as the number of changes in directors over the previous tw^o years.

X2

is defined as the natural log of the absolute change in total assets over the
previous two years.

X3

absolute change in loans/total assets over the previous two years.

X4

is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the audit firm in the prior year was among
the top 2 0 largest auditing practices and as 0 otherwise.

X5

is defined as the natural log of total assets in the prior year.

Xe

is a dummy variable, coded 1 if a first time small company audit qualifica
tion was received the previous year and 0 otherwise.

X?

change in disposable profit/total assets over the previous two years.

Xs

total loans/total assets in the previous year.

X9

secured loan, coded 1 if a firm has a secured loan and 0 otherwise.

Xio

the total number of non-director shareholders.

Em pirical Methods
Given the nature of the dependent variable, and the existence of
dichotom ous and continuous independent variables, the univariate results
were derived using chi-square tests and student <-tests where appropriate. In
terms of the multivariate analysis, the presence of a dichotom ous dependent
variable and dichotom ous independent variables suggests that a form of logit
analysis is the m ost suitable m ultivariate estim ating technique. T h e present
results were derived via the BMDP2 hierairchical stepwise lo git package. As
logit analysis is now a well-established research technique in accounting and
finance, further description is not given here.
EMPIRICAL R E SU LT S
T he empirical evidence presented here is based on the full pooled data set
of 360 observations. T he full pooled data set has been em ployed because the
empirical results for the two individual years of data were not significandy
different from one another or from the pooled data set. T he bivciriate Pearson
correlation matrix coefficients (see Appendix) indicate that, w hile som e of the
independent variables £ire significantly correlated w ith one another, they are
not of a magnitude w hich w ould suggest a serious m uldcollinearity problem.

An Agency Perspective of Auditor Change in Small Firms

55

Table 3
Univariate Relationships Between Auditor Changes and the Independent Variables
SECTION A.

Categorial Variables (X4, Xe and X 9 )
Switched

Non-Switched

Total

X2

15
69
84

55
221
276

70
290
360

0.2

Yes
No
Total

14
70
84

27
249
276

41
319
360

3.0*

Yes
No
Total

42
42
84

183
93
276

225
135
360

7.3***

X,
Auditor size
Top-20
Non-top-20
Total
X6
Audit Qualification

X,
Secured Loan

SECTION B:

Continuous Viarables (Xi, X 2, X 3, X 5, Xi, Xs, Xio)
(Standard deviadons in parentheses)
Switched

Xi
Change in directors
X2
Absolute change in total assets
X3
Absolute change in loans
divided by total assets
Xs
log total assets
Xi
Change in profits divided by
total assets
Xs
loans divided by total assets
Xio
Outside Shareholders
*
|!
U

Notes:

* = Sig at 10%
** = Sig at 5%
*** = Sig at 1%

Non-Switched

Total

T-value

2.01
(1.93)

1.47
(1.33)

1.60
(1.51)

2 4***

2.34
(1.63)

2.41
(2.07)

2.39
(1.97)

0.3

18.4
(18.2)
6.56
(1.38)

15.2
(13.2)
6.79
(1.52)

17.7
(17.2)
6.74
(1.49)

1.8**

1.3

0.4
(24.5)

5.2
(31.2)

4.1
(29.8)

1.5

35.8
(21.5)

32.5
(22.7)

33.3
(22.4)

1.2

0.62
(1.30)

0.72
(1.53)

0.69
(1.47)

0.6
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Univariate Results
As can be seen from Section A of T able 3, of the three dichotom ous
variables considered only the Auditor Size variable (X 4 ) is n ot significant at
10% confidence levels. T h e secured loan variable (X9) is significan t at 1%
confidence levels and indicates that relatively fewer of the firms that changed
auditors had loans secured on their assets. T h e Sm all C om pany Audit
Q ualification variable (Xe), though consistent w ith argum ents detailed
earlier, is only just significant at 10%. Section B of the table presents the
univariate statistics for the contin uous variables. W hile the relative
m agnitudes of these variables for firms that changed auditors and those that
did not are generally in the expected direction, only the change in directors
and change in loan variables are statistically significant at 5% confidence
levels.
M ultivariate Results
T he m ultivariate logistic function results are show n in T able 4. Section
A of the table presents the logistic function w hen all ten independent
variables are entered directly, w hile Section B presents the hierarchical
stepwise lo g it function results where entry is controlled by a statistical
significance level of 10%. T h e results for both functions are very similar in
that the five significant variables in the fu ll logistic function (Xi , X3, Xe,
Xs and X9) are also included, and have the same signs and magnitudes, in
the restricted stepwise function show n in Section B. D iscussion is, therefore,
directed to the stepwise function.
T he significant variables in the stepwise function are all of the ‘correct’
sign. T he function indicates that firms were sig^nificantiy more likely to
change their auditors if they
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

experienced more changes in directors (Xi),
experienced relatively large changes (positive or negative) in
their use of loan capital (X 3 )
had received a first-time Sm all C om pany Audit Qualification
in their previous set of accounts (Xe),
had relatively h ig h levels of loan capital (Xg), and

(v) did not have a loan secured on their business assets (X9 ).
In terms of an agency perspective, the primary m otivation for changing
auditors appears to be due to changes in the contracting environment
(changes in both the ownership and control of the com pany and changes
in the use of loan capital), a relatively high reliance upon external debt capital
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Table 4
SECTION A: Logistic Function: All Variables Included
Variable

Coefficient

Xi
X2
Xs
Xs
Xi
Xi
Xi
Xs
Xio

0.245
0.061
2.112
-0.322
-0.112
0.642
-0.498
1.291
-0.708
-0.15

2.9***
0.7
2.3***
0.9
0.9
1.7*
1.1
1.9*
2.5***
0.2

Constant

-0.677

0.8

X4

T-value

Likelihood ratio test = 28.5 with 10 d.f.
O iow R 2 = 0.09
Predictive acccmacy = 79.2%
SECTION B: Stepwise Logistic Function: Probability to Enter O.IO
Variable

Coefficient

Xi

0.230
1.827
0.666
1.507
-0.781
-1.421

X3

X6
Xg
X,
Constant

T-value
2.8***
2.0**
1.8*
2.4**
3.0***
4.3***

Likelihood ratio test = 25.6 with 6 d.f.
Chow
= 0.08
Predictive acccuracy = 78.9%

and the absence of external debtholder constraints as represented by the
existence of secured loans. C lient reputation effects, in the form of the receipt
of a first-time qualification are also significant.
DISCUSSIO N A N D C O N C LU SIO N S
In a recent paper, Crasswell [5] noted that auditor sw itching by large
Australian firms was related to the receipt of an audit qualification. T h is
result confirm ed that of an earlier piece of work by Chow and Rice [4] on
large U.S. firms. However, it could be argued that both of these studies overly
concentrated on establishing the significance/non-significance of audit
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qualifications for auditor sw itching, rather than considering a wider set of
explanatory variables. W hen W illiam s [22] adopted an agency view of auditor
sw itching, he found an auditor industry specialization variable, longevity
of audit engagem ent variable and a client negative m edia publicity variable
to be significant in exp lain in g w hy large U.S. firms changed auditors. He
found no statistical support for the argum ent that firms change auditors in
response to receiving an audit qualification.
T he results presented in this paper, in one sense support those of
W illiam s, in that there is positive evidence for a number of the agency
arguments investigated. T h e results, however, also contrast w ith those of
W illiam s in that the significance of the receipt of a first-time audit
qualification variable suggests that some sm all firms may change auditors
partly to secure more accom m odating m onitors. More im portantly, in terms
of statistical significance, is that the firms investigated here tended to have
a greater propensity to change auditors if they experienced relatively large
changes in their use of external loan capital, if they had relatively h igh levels
of loan capital and if none of these loans were secured. T h e results, therefore,
offer support for the agency arguments investigated and indicate that some
sm all firms in the U.K. may change auditors to obtain more accom m odating
monitors.
A PPEN D IX
Correlation Coefficients
X2

.10

Xs

-.1 4

-.1 4

X4

.02

.32

.02

Xs

.20

.54

.35

.07

X6

.05

.06

.06

.11

.02

Xt

.05

-.0 6

-.1 7

-.11

.16

-.0 9

Xg

-.1 6

-.2 7

.41

-.11

-.41

.05

-.11

X,

.01

.14

-.01

0.07

.29

.06

.08

.05

Xio

.07

-.0 3

-.0 2

-.0 7

.06

-.1 0

.03

-.11

.07

AC

.15

-.0 2

-.0 8

-.0 2

-.0 6

.09

-.0 7

.06

-.1 4

.03

Xi

X2

X3

X4

Xs

Xe

Xj

Xs

X,

X,o
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